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 David Lederer
 Sociology's "One Law": Moral Statistics, Modernity,
 Religion, and German Nationalism in the Suicide
 Studies of Adolf Wagner and Alexander von Oettingen
 Abstract
 From the onset, moral statistics were influenced by religious discourse. During
 the nineteenth century, Adolf Wagner discovered the "One Law" of sociology:
 Protestants always kill themselves more often than Catholics. Deployed by his col
 league, the Baltic nationalist theologian Alexander wn (Dettingen, it became a
 moral'statistical plank in the modernity thesis and supported a Prussian master
 narrative of history. Accordingly, it justified the unification of Germany according
 to the small German model of a Kulturnation excluding Catholic Austria. This
 interpretation, in turn, influenced subsequent generations of German sociologists,
 who described modernity in idealist and spiritual terms. In this, they differed from
 the more mechanistic and materialist theories of French sociologists, in particular
 Émile Dürkheim.
 There is a well-known dictum that statistics are never value-free. The moment a
 question is raised for statistical measurement, it is presumed worth measuring.
 Nineteenth-century bureaucratic states shared a common interest in the power
 of demographic statistics with the nascent discipline of sociology. National gov
 ernments employed statisticians to monitor their populations and recommend
 policies that might improve growth, viewed as inherently positive. For their part,
 early charters of social policy vetted their professional credentials by citing statis
 tics as objective scientific measures of social values in the service of the state.
 Both parties partook of essential certitudes, the chief being the enlightened
 principle of the common weal, an ultimate good achieved in pursuit of national
 interests as expressions of the popular will of the majority. Not surprisingly, dis
 tinct ideological strands of sociological interpretation gradually became
 enshrined in national schools of thought.
 The collation of national suicide statistics (still promulgated by the World
 Health Organization1 ) accompanied the process from the start. Suicide data cap
 tured the attention of a wider public as no other area of statistical expression.
 On the one hand, the subject lent itself to easy quantification of objective
 categories—gender, profession, season, method, etc.—allowing not only for
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 meticulous collection of obvious social 'facts' surrounding individual cases, but
 also for straight-forward comparative analysis: A man is not a woman, Winter
 not Summer, hanging not drowning. On the other hand, measuring the sensa
 tional and disturbing self-negation of life lent the otherwise arduous, dry, and
 often lengthy statistical process a hint of prurient interest. In an age poised to
 cut the chains of the ancient régime and grapple with anxieties of industrialized
 modernity, suicide statistics seemed to offer a scientific key to unlock the inner
 most workings of the human soul.
 Suicide statistics proffered objectifiable evidence to evaluate nagging ques
 tions about human identity and free-will at a time when some contemporaries
 viewed society almost as mechanistically as its novel modes of production.2 Not
 so immediately obvious (at least to us perhaps) was the extent to which other
 professedly secular sociologists and social psychologists built upon pre-existing
 moral, spiritual, and religious debates. For example, Emile Dürkheim is often
 credited with establishing the so-called "One Law of Sociology" or "Durkheim's
 Law": Protestants always kill themselves more often than Catholics.3 Like so
 many aspects of his research, that particular observation derives from the work
 of others, in this case the moral statisticians Adolf Wagner and his colleague
 Alexander von Oettingen.4 Their views, in turn, arose in the context of the
 nineteenth-century debate over modernity, German unification and national
 identity, with its overtly religious overtones.
 Ideologies impinged on statistical demography since the earliest work of
 John Graunt in his Natural and Political Observations upon the Bills of Mortality
 (1662).5 Graunt's eye for Baconian natural history and epidemiology (e.g.
 disease, birth vs. death rates, the potential for a male/female population imbal
 ance through war) focused keenly on population increase as a reason-of-state
 policy. In addition to his statistical analysis of natural influences on population
 growth, Graunt also pondered behavioral factors. For example, he initiated what
 became a long-standing debate on marriage, specifically the pros and cons of
 polygamy. He cited examples from animal husbandry, livestock breeding and the
 herd instinct to provocatively argue by analogy against polygamous marriages—
 e.g. those practiced by Muslims—which did not necessarily foster population
 growth. From this he inferred the demographic superiority of Christian morality
 as a moderating behavior behind positive growth. From its very inception, there
 fore, demographic record-keeping infused Christian morality into statistics as an
 arbiter of social norms and values in the service of European states. By the nine
 teenth century, such behavioral measurements became widely known as moral
 statistics.
 The first comprehensive history of moral statistics was written by a professor
 of evangelical theology at the Estonian University of Dorpart (Tartu),
 Alexander von Oettingen (1827-1905). Founded in 1632 by Gustavus
 Adolphus, nineteenth-century Dorpat University was a hotbed of German
 nationalism. It also retained a strong Lutheran tradition and, especially during
 the nineteenth century, theology remained its strongest faculty.6 From 1802 to
 1893, the primary language of instruction was German, as were the majority of
 the faculty, being either Baltic Germans from distinguished local families (like
 Oettingen) or outsiders (like Wagner), who came directly from Germany, not
 infrequently in a state of quasi-academic exile.7 Dorpat intellectuals lived within
 the boundaries of Czarist Russia, but were partisans of Hegelian historical
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 686  Journal of Social History Spring 2013
 dialecticism and the transcendental idealism of Schelling. Their influence upon
 generations of neighboring Scandinavian and Russian nationalists and scholars
 matched their own romantic yearnings for repatriation into a German-speaking
 empire, which had once stretched beyond the Memel into the Baltic colonies of
 the Teutonic Order and the cities of the Hanseatic League.8
 Oettingen's history of moral statistics appeared in a lengthy 1868 study.9 Its
 title and the subtitle of volume one illuminated Oettingen's programmatic tra
 jectory: Moral Statistics: Inductive Proof of the Regularity of the Moral Life-Rhythms
 in the Organism of Humanity, volume I, Moral statistics and Christian Moral
 Teachings: Attempt at a Social Ethics on an Empirical Basis. Clearly, as late as the
 second-half of the nineteenth century, Christian morality and an organic inter
 pretation of society continued to pervade work on suicide.
 According to Oettingen's history of statistics, Johann Peter Süssmilch
 (1707-1787) takes pride of place as the founder of "a [type of—DL] moral statis
 tics," an accolade later echoed by none other than Dürkheim.10 Whether
 Süssmilch (who counted Kant and Lessing among his personal correspondents)
 actually deserves 'founding-father' status for inventing moral statistics remains
 controversial.11 More relevant to our discussion is his position on human behav
 ior in relation to Christian morality as a contributing factor in population
 growth and, equally, the economic health of the state.
 A Lutheran pastor from the Pietist University of Halle, Süssmilch was sub
 sequently inducted into the Prussian Academy of Sciences for work in statistical
 demographics. His Divine Order in the Circumstances of Human Sex, Birth, Death
 and Reproduction (Berlin, 1741) argued for advantages of a Christian moral
 economy to increase population in the service of the Prussian state.12 The dem
 ographic model in Süssmilch's Divine Order combined mercantilist economic
 theory and evangelical theology.13 Ostensibly, since state power and prosperity
 ultimately depended upon the number of its subjects and their annual rate of
 increase, he directed states to follow Luther's biblical imperative in their demo
 graphic policy: "Be fruitful and multiply."14
 In reference to Süssmilch, the British historian of statistics Ian Hacking
 deploys Foucault's concept "biopolitics" to refer to the apparent confluence of
 interests between the bodies of subjects and the social body of the state.15
 Empirically, we can attribute the almost obsessive interest of German territorial
 states with population growth to the demographic catastrophes of the Thirty
 Years War and the Seven Years War. Indeed, the term "Statistihad first
 appeared in a work by a Prussian scholar Gottfried Achenwall in 1749 to
 describe "remarkable facts about the state."16
 The chief considerations of Süssmilch's Divine Order were threefold: 1. The
 natural inclination for the human race to increase; 2. the role of marriage and
 fecundity; and, 3. the positive balance of birth over mortality under normal cir
 cumstances. Through an examination of parish registers, he discovered that pop
 ulation increase remained constant over time, attributing this to God's Divine
 Order. Pastor Süssmilch also considered how immoral behavior (i.e., sin)
 impacted adversely upon growth as a manifestation of celestial displeasure,
 taking the form of a natural law. Apart from war, which he viewed as a vile
 curse, and impediments to general fecundity presented by divorce and remarriage
 at a late age (both of which needed to be controlled morally), he once again
 took up Graunt's theme of polygamy.17
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 Süssmilch consciously followed the model of Graunt for most of his study
 and even referred to Graunt as a "Columbus" in the study of demographic statis
 tics.18 However, Süssmilch not only attacked polygamy as practiced in Ottoman
 society as detrimental to increase because of its reliance on eunuchs, but further
 compared Ottoman eunuchs to Catholic priests.19 He roundly condemned the
 Catholic doctrine of celibacy as deterrent to natural increase and a potential
 source of moral corruption, roundly favoring the Protestant policy of a married
 clergy. Süssmilch also confirmed previous claims that the rate of birth for boys
 was only slightly higher than for girls, a fact ordained by divine providence to
 correct later male losses at sea and in war.20 Therefore, given the nearly equal
 numbers of men and women in the world, marriage (also identified in
 Oettingen's history of moral statistics as the only legitimate method of popula
 tion increase) became a sum-zero game. For one man to take more than one
 wife must necessarily deprive another, while for anyone to remain celibate must
 also leave another partnerless. Were sex ratios imbalanced, were there say twice
 as many women as men in the world, polygamy or celibacy would not be sins,
 but indeed might even be Christian duties. 1 However, in reality, this was not
 the situation set out in the Divine Order.
 127 years later, on the eve of the German Kulturkampf, which pitted
 Protestants against Catholics, Oettingen offered up Süssmilch as the harbinger
 of moral statistics. In an age when Prussia was seen by many as the legitimate
 heir to German nationalist aspirations, it should be recalled that Sturm und
 Drang romanticist authors like Goethe and Schiller had promoted the Saxon
 theologian, Martin Luther, as a national hero. From their point of view, Luther
 had taken an historic stance against foreign (papal and, by inference, Austrian)
 interference in internal German affairs at a time when Germany was little more
 than a cultural and linguistic notion. Germany, the nation of culture
 (Kulturnation), thus eulogized Luther for translating the Bible from Latin into
 the German vernacular.
 In the traditional evangelical master-narrative of national history, the
 Borussian (i.e., Prussian) school juxtaposed the small German solution for unifi
 cation to a large German solution which included Catholic Austria. It acknowl
 edged Martin Luther as a legitimate founding-father figure of the German
 nation. Here, Oettingen's claim's for pastor Süssmilch as the Urvater of moral
 statistics fit brilliantly. And the claim was not entirely inimical to the facts; an
 entire generation of German Pietists and their associates figured among the ear
 liest students of social, psychological, and psychiatric behavior in the late
 eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century Germany (e.g., Karl Philipp Moritz,
 Johann Christian August Heinroth, Johann Christian Reil and Goethe, among
 them).
 Whether or not we accept Oettingen's claim for Süssmilch as the Urvater of
 moral statistics, there is at least one clear connection between his work and that
 of the first self-proclaimed practitioners of moral statistics in early nineteenth
 century. As Ursula Baumann is quick to point out, moral statistics tended to
 focus—far more often than not—on types of behavior generally recognized by
 contemporaries as immoral, such as suicide, crime and divorce.22 The
 Enlightenment recognized a link between the moral and mental faculties, while
 alienists regularly prescribed moral treatments for insanity. However, a precise
 definition of moral statistics remains elusive, not least of all because most early
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 practitioners were amateur polymaths rather than bureaucrats or academics.
 Certainly, Oettingen's massive contemplation of Moral Statistics offers little in
 the way of a succinct explanation of its subject. The Oxford Dictionary of
 Sociology confirms this vagueness, noting that the interests of moral statisticians
 included "suicide, divorce, mental health, illegitimacy, and abortion" as indica
 tors of social pathology, defined, in turn, as "An early form of deviance theory,
 no longer in wide use, which drew upon the organic metaphor to suggest that
 parts of societies, like parts of bodies, could suffer breakdown and disease."23
 The values measured remained steeped in Christian moral casuistry and the
 effects measured "silently presumed their negative evaluation."24
 Officially, moral statistics came to life in the title of an essay by
 André-Michel Guerry (1802-1866), Essai sur la statistique morale de France, pub
 lished in 1833. At the very end of his Essai, Guerry offered an all-encompassing
 definition of moral statistics:
 Moral statistics, having as its object of investigation the mind of man, studies
 his capabilities, his morals and customs, his feelings and sentiments, and his
 passions. Thus it encompasses at once the whole of moral philosophy, politics,
 religion, legislation, history, literature and the arts.25
 Guerry studied law at the University of Poitiers and, after admittance to the bar,
 he was appointed Director of Criminal Statistics in Paris shortly after the
 Revolution in 1830. In this capacity, he compiled data for the Compte général de
 l'administration de la justice criminelle en France, a massive compilation of criminal
 data previously commissioned in 1825. Riveted by the implications of the
 Compte général, Guerry retooled them for his statistical analysis in the later Essai.
 Driven by the question of recidivism, he took a keen interest in the relationship
 between the various forms of deviant behavior reported in the Compte général.
 From the birth of moral statistics, suicide served as the immediate and
 primary focal point. According to Guerry himself, "Among the subjects
 included in moral statistics, suicide is one of those which has attracted the most
 lively attention and about which there has been the most discussion."26
 Hacking suspiciously treats the centrality of suicide in early statistics as the
 product of apparently competing national debates, which were actually colluding
 discourses between rising groups of professional elites from different nations. In
 other words, by stoking international controversy over comparative suicide rates,
 statisticians legitimized their own raison d'être. Anecdotally, for example,
 Hacking interprets a debate between British and French medical scholars at the
 end of the Napoleonic Wars—which he rhetorically likens to an ideological
 extension of the military struggle—as an actual wink of solidarity between pro
 fessionals across national frontiers.27 In 1815, "a little salvo fired" first by the ali
 enist George Burrows (who followed French medical studies during the Wars
 despite difficulties in obtaining them) attributed higher levels of suicide in Paris
 than London to a turn from religion which had literally demoralized post
 revolutionary France:
 Whether this deplorable propensity by the consequence only of recent political
 events which, having annihilated religion have deprived the wretched of its
 resources and consolations in affliction, and by their demoralizing effects
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 dissolved the social compact that alone makes life a blessing, is not easy to
 determine.28
 International debate was soon joined by the French alienist, Jean-Etienne
 Dominique Esquirol. Esquirol "took up cudgels against the egregious Burrows
 who had dared to suggest that Parisians are more suicidal than Londoners."29
 Equally, by joining debate with a fellow alienist, Hacking implies that the two
 were in cahoots to establish suicide as an illness and thereby expropriate it (and
 by implication all other aspects of moral degeneracy) from the police as the sole
 province of physicians and alienists.
 By the time Guerry entered the field, however, he was quick to point out
 inadequacies in his own suicide data. For instance, he correctly noted that
 suicide was no longer a crime.30 Certainly, suicide had been criminalized during
 the ancien régime and stigmatized right up until the revolution. It is, then, hardly
 surprising if segments of French society continued to view it as such, or if it
 retained categorical ambivalence for some time thereafter. However, a better
 explanation for the reporting of some, but by no means all suicides to the
 Ministry of Justice was purely procedural and had been so for centuries: Suicides
 were only reported to the Ministry when the circumstances of death were
 unclear and an investigation had be initiated to determine whether suicide, foul
 play or death by misadventure had been the cause of mortality.
 As a former ministry employee, Guerry knew this and it lead him to
 acknowledge that the limitations of his sources reflected wide-spread underre
 porting of suicide at large. Guerry also conducted the first-ever social content
 analysis in history, examining suicide notes on file with the Paris police to estab
 lish motive. His methods remained largely wooden nonetheless, limited to the
 tabulation of hangings, charcoal, shootings and the like, short of any qualitative
 attempt to analyze the texts themselves. Overall, apart from attempting to estab
 lish a link between self-killing and recidivism and to tabulate personal motives
 for the act, Guerry's study revealed patterns of an inverse relationship between
 suicide and homicide rates throughout France; whereas the North of France had
 higher rates of suicide and lower rates of murder, the South exhibited the oppo
 site tendencies.
 Guerry's Essai wandered through other categories of moral statistics, particu
 larly crime and education. He originated rank-order statistics to demonstrate,
 counter-intuitively, that crime rates actually increased in areas of France with
 higher levels of education. Otherwise, Guerry avoided sweeping generalizations
 about any systemic implications of moral statistics, which he viewed as facts
 which should speak for themselves. Twice awarded the Montyon prize (in 1833
 for the Essai and 1864 for his comparative study of Britain and France), he
 achieved international renown for graphic representations of moral statistics in
 tables and, more famously, for cartographic representations. The latter caused
 something of a minor sensation when he took his maps on tour, notably in
 France and England where they stimulated debate over the role of culture,
 behavior, and morality. However, he seldom speculated on the matter, preferring
 to rely on the self-explanatory and objective nature of his numbers.
 In the history of statistics (and Oettingen's is no exception), Guerry is
 largely upstaged by his contemporary, Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quetelet
 (1796-1874). The Belgian polymath was awarded the first doctorate in the
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 sciences from the University of Ghent in 1819 and, in the following year,
 elected into the Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles.31
 Guerry and Quetelet; two persons could hardly have had such different charac
 ters. Both claimed to have discovered statistical evidence for the regularity of
 crime and a petty feud ensued: Guerry (who wrote Quetelet to suggest a possible
 collaboration) received a public rebuff. Guerry was a quiet observer of fact with
 an eye for ambiguities. Quetelet was a public relations barnstormer who extrapo
 lated widely to engage in system building. Indeed, Quetelet quarreled with other
 disciplinary neighbors, not least Auguste Comte. As a result, Comte had to
 re-dub his own systemic positivism "sociology" when Quetelet borrowed the
 term "social-physics" from him and employed it in a fashion which dissatisfied
 Comte, its originator. And thus, sociology was born of a feud.
 One of Quetelet's chief contributions was to establish the "average man" as
 the yardstick against which all human behavior was measured. According to
 Desrosières, "the moral attributes of the average man [were]—an ideal intended
 by the Creator, and a symbol of perfection ... Endowed with every virtue,
 Quetelet's "average man" was presented as a kind of prudent centrist, who
 avoided every conceivable form of excess—for perfection lies in moderation."32
 This average or aggregate man existed sui generis beyond the individual.
 Quetelet's theory on causes (he recognized three: constant, variable, and acci
 dental) fanned the forthcoming debate over social fatalism and individual
 liberty, which contemporaries likened to the classic religious dispute over
 Calvinist predestination and Catholic free-will.33
 Although Quetelet's direct empirical contribution to suicide research
 remained limited, his system heavily influenced Adolf Heinrich Gotthilf
 Wagner (1835-1917), a leading compiler of suicide statistics during the
 nineteenth-century. Wagner took up the theory of regularity in moral statistics
 and added his own theory of increase. Indeed, Wagner saw increase everywhere
 in the process of modernization and established a law of constantly increasing
 state bureaucracy still known today as Wagner's Law.34
 Born the son of an Erlangen physiology professor, Wagner received his doc
 torate in economics from Göttingen in 1857.35 A contentious figure, Wagner's
 choleric temperament often involved him in running scholarly feuds which, ini
 tially, precluded him from a permanent academic position in any German state.
 Consequently, he took a chair at the University of Dorpat in 1865 and devel
 oped a relationship—as close as was possible for Wagner—with Alexander von
 Oettingen. From that time onward, he associated himself closely with
 Bismarck's policies toward German unification under Prussian leadership. Called
 back to Germany in 1870 to assume the chair of economics in Berlin, he pro
 moted policies of unification and played a central role in establishing state social
 welfare under Bismarck (an area where his theories remain highly influential).
 At the academy, he became a chief spokesperson for academic socialism
 (Kathedersozialismus). His surviving correspondence testifies to a single-minded
 resolve to defeat opponents and detractors, including conflicts with even his
 closest colleagues Gustav von Schmoller and Lujo Brentano. In 1895, he
 became embroiled in a bitter public contest with Freiherr von Stumm-Halberg,
 a contentious member of the Reichstag and a personal friend of the Kaiser, who
 ultimately challenged Wagner to a duel.3 Wagner was politically active
 throughout his career, campaigning for national unification, state-sponsored
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 socialism and, as a charter member of both the anti-Semitic Christian National
 Socialist Party and the Evangelical Social Congress, "W. then became one of
 the outstanding members of contemporary Protestantism."37
 Through the publication of his monumental The Laws of Regularity in
 Apparently Arbitrary Human Behavior from the Viewpoint of Statistics just prior to
 his departure for Dorpat, Wagner already possessed a reputation as a master of
 statistics.38 Consciously locating himself in the tradition of Quetelet, Wagner set
 out to prove, from a statistical point of view, human behavior was essentially
 repetitive, but certain types of that behavior increased gradually with moderniza
 tion, thereby admitting a systemic dynamic for historical change. However, like
 Guerry, he seldom attempted explanations either for the qualitative implications
 of behavioral types or the underlying causes of historical change, preferring to
 view both processes as simple social facts.
 Part one of The Laws of the Regularity broadly considers the theoretical rami
 fications and underlying methodology of the work, whereas sections comment
 ing upon specific types of behavior (marriage, suicide, etc.) are relatively brief.
 However, part two—by far the most extensive—is comprised in almost two
 thirds by the presentation of evidence on suicide statistics from a fairly compre
 hensive number of perspectives. Thus, it is fair to suggest that suicide formed
 the main substance of Wagner's work on statistics.
 This is not the place to examine his voluminous results in their minutia.
 However, the most enduring aspect of his suicide research remains his revelation
 about differential rates of suicide between religious confessions, particularly
 Catholics and Protestants, though he did examine available rates for Jews and
 Greek Orthodox as well. While cautious about some of his results, on one
 point, Wagner was unequivocal:
 The result of this examination is hereby the following: Suicide in Europe is
 most frequent among Protestants, perhaps even somewhat more frequent
 among the Reformed than Evangelicals; among Catholics it is very much rarer,
 perhaps among Greek Christians even more rare; among Jews suicide is usually
 rarer still than among Catholics and perhaps only somewhat equally frequent or
 less frequent than among Greeks.39
 In his explication of statistics on the relationship of religion to suicide, Wagner
 remained highly critical. In particular, he was concerned to insure that his com
 parisons between confessions took numerous factors into consideration, as he
 tried to establish a level playing field by matching environmental contexts.40
 These included: nationality, ethnic group, climate, culture, education, economy,
 and quality of life.41 Wagner believed that the most reliable comparisons were
 made between different confessions in the same region, and here again, his con
 clusions were verified: With few variations, Protestants always seemed to kill
 themselves more often than Catholics. In his concluding remarks, he regretted
 the lack of proper data on Moslems and Buddhists thus preventing meaningful
 comparisons which might have verified his suggestions on the nature of the dif
 ference more universally. While Wagner did not attribute lower rates of suicide
 to religious doctrine, he did admit that consolatory rituals, such as Catholic
 auricular confession, played a role. He also agreed with the French mad-doctor
 Lisle that suicide is higher among peoples who exhibit a greater internalization
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 of beliefs. Wagner held the sober and rational teachings of Protestantism, as well
 as their higher level of education (Volksbildung) responsible for a more progres
 sive and secular outlook.42 Among peoples with a higher level of outwardly rit
 ualized religiosity, beliefs act as a brake against suicidal behavior.
 Although Wagner couched his explanation is polite rhetoric, his conde
 scension towards other religions is clear. Protestantism—particularly evangelical
 and reformed Protestantism as practiced in states like Prussia—he clearly viewed
 as more modern than Catholicism. And now, to prove it, there was hard scien
 tific evidence. Naturally, this was music to the ears of those German nationalists
 who favored a small German solution to unification, to exclude the Catholic
 Hapsburgs of Austria, traditional rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. Wagner was
 cautious not to take his work its logical conclusions. The actual implications of
 his data, though admittedly bound to attract the attention of doctors, psychia
 trists, philosophers, theologians, and last, but not least, statesmen, was left to
 the observer.
 However, Wagner never partook of secular fatalism and concluded his work
 on a transcendental note. After reiterating his most important findings, he
 returned to the subject of causality. At the end of the day, only God alone
 could ever actually know the motivations behind each individual suicide, which
 most certainly included acts of free will, even if Protestants killed themselves
 more often than Catholics. Years later, in a book review, Wagner expressed
 content with Enrico Morselli's recapitulation of many themes from his own
 work on suicide.43 He also took the opportunity to praise his Dorpat colleague
 Oettingen for convincing him of his exaggerated reliance on mechanistic views
 of society and suicide.44 Towards the end of his career, he attacked what he saw
 as low morals prevailing among urban populations in industrialized cities, where
 base materialism aroused envy and greed, especially in England and among the
 Jews.45 In 1910, he supported agrarian land reform in favor of communal inter
 ests and publicly exhorted all Protestant pastors to support it as well.46
 Thus, our trail leads back to Alexander von Oettingen, Protestant theolo
 gian and author of a history of moral statistics. In his introduction, Oettingen
 heaped praise on Wagner, who (though they disagreed on many points, not sur
 prisingly) provided a model for his arguments and a method for gathering statis
 tics. In that area, the student had even outdone the master; Oettingen's final
 statistical data provided the basis for much of Morselli's and Durkheim's later
 works. Oettingen also couldn't help but recognize that the first self-conscious
 practitioners of moral statistics—Quetelet and Guerry—were products of French
 national aspirations and, as such, examples of the unifying potential of national
 moral statistics for Germany to follow as well.47
 In a subsequent work, On Acute and Chronic Suicide, Oettingen tackled the
 implications of Wagner's work on religion and suicide even more directly.48
 Apparently, he discovered the politically charged potential of suicide statistics
 after a speaking tour and decided to commit himself to one more short publica
 tion on the subject before embarking on a major study of Lutheran Dogma.49
 On Acute and Chronic Suicide raised a battery of issues which, by then, informed
 nascent suicidology and modern statistical sociology. As his title suggested,
 Oettingen recognized accidental (acute) causes, but the regularity of his statistics
 demonstrated beyond doubt that suicide followed long-term patterns which fluc
 tuated little over time. The one fluctuation evidenced was a constant tendency
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 toward increase. This Oettingen blamed on the strains of modern civilization on
 mental health. As people enjoyed the progress of material comforts, they were
 liable to suffer ennui and become world weary through excessive consumption
 (Lebensgenuss). Oettingen too recognized higher rates among Protestants than
 Catholics, but the theologian argued against any inherent deficiency in
 Lutheran dogma, since it offered believers adequate tools of consolation, if they
 only knew where to find them.50 Unfortunately, too many modern Protestants
 engaged in the pursuit of worldly matters to the exception of their inner spiritual
 life. Suicide among modern Protestants he likened to an infectious disease, with
 the evangelical religion representing the proper anti-septic, like some carbolic
 acid.51 As for the duties of being a Protestant, Oettingen couldn't deny a greater
 demand for sacrifices than among Catholics, "with their priestly life-insurance
 tendencies" or for Greek "orientalists." However, it was not only their supersti
 tious religiosity, but also their impure culture, which differentiated them from
 Protestants:
 Therefore it is understandable that the German, with his high culture and deep
 inner affective life, with his tendency to self-reflection and self-critique, carries
 with him a greater danger of suicide than the easy-living, sanguine Roman or
 the even less developed, less-civilized Slav, who only tends toward suicide,
 when licked by half-culture or if infected with nihilism. 2
 Expressions of sentiments like these not only consoled German nationalists
 during the Kulturkampf, but also German émigrés and ultra-nationalist Baltic
 Germans living in Dorpat under the Czar among the Slavs. Ultimately, it
 proved a slippery slope from Wagner's scientific conclusions to the unfettered
 and pseudo-scientific cultural narcissism of Oettingen's Acute and Chronic
 Suicide.
 Now, armed with scientific certainty that Protestants were more suicidal
 than Catholics and that suicide rates increased with any given society's level of
 modernity, subsequent sociologists (many of them, incidentally, German
 Lutherans) went on to establish the modernity thesis. Max Weber, Werner
 Sombart, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Ernst Troeltsch numbered among its most
 notable advocates. According to this thesis, modernity evolved out of the inner
 worldly asceticism of the Protestant work ethic, which manifested itself in a
 Geist or Spirit of Capitalism, according to the title of Weber's influential 1905
 work. In 1911, for example, the Lutheran theologian Ernst Troeltsch stepped in
 for Weber (suffering severe depression at the time) to deliver a manifesto in a
 special issue of the Historische Zeitschrift entitled, The Meaning of Protestantism for
 the Rise of the Modern World.53 In the opening line, he paid tribute to Weber's
 notion of the Protestant spirit of inner worldly asceticism in stark contrast to
 the materialism of the modern world.
 Even more emphatically than Weber or Troeltsch, Werner Sombart harped
 upon the relationship of religion to modern capitalism in The Bourgeoisie of
 1913. He too opened his work in praise of Weber. In all three cases, Hegelian
 nationalism is openly flaunted in an historicist conceptualization of the Zeitgeist.
 We should recall this against the backdrop of German National unification, only
 realized several decades prior in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War. Historicism
 played a major legitimizing role in the master-narrative of German unification as
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 Martin Luther entered the pantheon of German national heros. The nationalist
 master-narrative on the relationship of modernity to Protestantism continued to
 influence sociologists and Reformation scholars for decades.
 The apparent discovery of differential rates of suicide between Protestants
 and Catholics would be adopted by Dürkheim with such certainty in Le Suicide
 that scholars generally refer to it (whether in agreement or disagreement) as
 sociology's "One Law." By embedding the behavioral variation of suicide rates in
 science, it now became possible for scholars to objectify cultural differences
 between Catholics and Protestants.
 There can be little doubt that the work of Wagner and Oettingen on
 suicide, well known at the time, played a seminal role in the development of the
 modernity thesis and influenced an entire generation of scholars. Dürkheim cer
 tainly incorporated much of their statistical evidence into his own work, along
 with that of the Italian psychiatrist, Enrico Morselli. As for German sociologists,
 Wagner's dry quantitative proofs combined with his Dorpat colleague's doctri
 naire interpretation of the religious Zeitgeist to infuse a Protestant national
 master narrative of German history with sociological modernism. While their
 influence on Weber was indirect, their links to his contemporary correspond
 ents, Sombart, Tönnies, and Troeltsch, are far clearer.
 Wagner served as Sombart's mentor, guiding his PhD at the Friedrich
 Wilhelms University (today, the Humboldt University). Eventually, Sombart
 succeeded his mentor to the chair of national economy in Berlin. While we
 know less of Wagner's relationship with Ferdinand Tönnies (author of a quintes
 sential work on modernity, From Community to Society), fourteen pieces of corre
 spondence from Tönnies are registered in Kirchner's inventory of Wagner's
 personal papers, including a eulogy to Wagner published shortly after his death
 in 1917 by Tönnies.54
 Wagner also corresponded with Ernst Troeltsch on at least five occasions.55
 However, the ideological relationship of Troeltsch to Oettingen was far closer.
 Both figured as the leading German-speaking Lutheran theologians of their age.
 In 1897, when invited to review Oettingen's voluminous work on evangelical
 dogma for the Göttingenschen gelehrten Anzeigen, Troeltsch accepted without hes
 itation. He opened his review by lauding Oettingen as an "honorable Veteran of
 Baltic Lutheranism" and throughout the review Troeltsch praised Oettingen for
 his thorough appreciation of modernity in his theological outlook.56
 In 1897, Durkheim's Le Suicide employed the subject of suicide as a vehicle
 to establish scientific credentials for the quantitative method. Dürkheim pro
 posed the now-famous paradigm of four societal types and their suicidal aetiol
 ogy: egotistical, fatalistic, altruistic, and finally anomic.57 In the latter anomic
 typology, modern social structures disintegrated individuals from communal
 support mechanisms leaving them adrift in a world of vast impersonal forces. For
 Dürkheim, this was the chief characteristic of urbanized industrial societies in
 the West and explained rising rates of suicide there. Thus, the more materially
 modern the society, the greater its susceptibility to high rates of suicide.
 In France, Louis Napoleon's rise to power through an alliance with the
 Church ended in a secular backlash during the Third Republic against Catholic
 anti-modernists. Many viewed high rates of suicide as a negative measure of
 degeneracy and the decay of public mental health in modern society. Dürkheim
 and others, such as the neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot,58 adopted a fatalistic
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 approach toward suicide and neuroses as regrettable but necessary aspects of
 material progress, albeit entirely lacking in the spiritual and religious connota
 tions put forward by Oettingen and others.59 For Dürkheim, the contemporary
 scandal of the Dreyfus affair contributed to his pronounced stance on secular
 modernity.
 Unlike Dürkheim and the French sociologists, who relied more heavily on
 environmental, material and mechanical social explanations for suicide and
 modernity, German advocates of the modernity thesis tied their results closely
 to a Hegelian historical interpretation of the Protestant Reformation as the har
 binger of German nationalism. Like Weber, Sombart's own engagement with a
 transcendental Zeitgeist caused him to subordinate statistics to intuitive interpre
 tations of ideal types. He jokingly disparaged the French quantitative goal to
 establish sociology as a quasi-natural science a la Comte using a Freudian quip,
 referring to it as physics envy.
 In this context, the "One Law" of sociology provided German Protestants
 with an internationally recognized—if somewhat perverse—badge of modernity.
 It was with noticeable envy that the Italian psychiatrist Enrico Morselli extrapo
 lated a history of the Northern tribes of ancient Europe from classical works of
 the Roman authors Tacitus and Suetonius.60 He noted their astonishment at
 the apparent contempt among Saxon warriors for their own lives, attributing it
 to climate and their racial stock. Above all others, "The centre of the purest
 German stocks is Saxony, the old and powerful land of the Teutons, and it
 presents a very high average [of suicide—DL]."61 Morselli's modern statistics
 therefore implied a link to Saxon history through their astonishingly high rate
 of suicide. And certainly, as the birthplace of Luther, Saxony epitomized the
 modern ideal of a German State. For Morselli, the remarkable success of the
 German national experiment was a shining example for Italians. In that regard,
 suicide represented a regrettable, but "... fatal tendency of civilized society,"62 a
 natural way for society to cleanse its body politic of weaker members.
 Endnotes
 Address correspondence to David Lederer, National University of Ireland, Maynooth,
 Maynooth Co. Kildare, Ireland. Email: dlederer@nuim.ie.
 1. Available at: http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide_rates/en/ (accessed
 March 3, 2012).
 2. Emile Durkheim's doctoral dissertation on The Division of Labour refers to social
 change as, "mechanically produced by necessary [social] causes": Anthony Giddens,
 Émile Dürkheim (London, 1980), 39.
 3. See Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, Religion, Deviance and Social Control
 (London, 1997), 45-52, for a recent and piqued sociological critique of its inviability.
 The authors correctly identify the origins of the thesis with Adolf Wagner.
 4. H.C. Erik Midelfort also identifies Wagner as the source of this dubious maxim in his
 historical analysis of suicide among early modern evangelical Lutherans in, "Religious
 Melancholy and Suicide: On the Reformation Origins of a Sociological Stereotype,"
 Graven Images 3 (1996): 41. The skewed nature of the original and subsequent statistical
 tabulation of suicides by religious confession (already noted by Wagner) is the subject of
 two articles from the journal Social Forces: Whitney Pope & Nick Danigelis, "Sociology's
 'One Law,'" 60 (1981): 495-516; and William B. Bankston, H. David Allen, and Daniel
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Journal of Social History Spring 2013
 S. Cunningham, "Religion and Suicide: A Research Note on Sociology's 'One Law,'" 62
 (1983): 521-28. See also, Charles E. Faupel, Gregory S. Kowalski, and Paul D. Starr,
 "Sociology's One Law: Religion and Suicide in the Urban Context," Journal for the
 Scientific Study of Religion 26 (1987): 523-53.
 5. Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a Following Index and Made Upon the Bills
 of Mortality ... with Reference to the Government, Religion, Trade, Growth, Ayre, Diseases,
 and the Several Changes of the Said City (London, 1662).
 6. On the reputation of the theological faculty, see Erich Donnert, Die Universität
 Dorpat-Jurev 1802-1918. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Hochschulwesens in den
 Ostseeprovinzen des Russischen Reiches (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), 90-95.
 7. Two of Oettingen's brothers simultaneously held chairs at the university: ibid., 47, 84,
 90. In 1886, Emil Kraepelin became professor of psychiatry in Dorpat, another emigreé
 from Germany.
 8. On the influence of Wagner and Oettingen on Scandinavian and Russian suicidology,
 see Evelyne Luef, "Low Morals at a High Latitude? Suicide in Nineteenth Century
 Scandinavia," Journal of Social History 46, no 3 (2013): 668-83, and Susan Morrissey,
 "Mapping Civilization: The Cultural Geography of Suicide Statistics in Russia," Journal of
 Social History 46, no 3 (2013): 651-67.
 9. Die Moralstatistik, lnductiver Nachweis der Gesetzmäßigkeit sittlicher Lebensbewegung im
 Organismus der Menschheit, vol. I: Die Moralstatistik und die christliche Sittenlehre. Versuch
 einer Socialethik auf empirischer Grundlage (Erlangen, 1868).
 10. Oettingen, Moralstatistik, 99.
 11. In Hugh P. Whitt and Victor W. Reinking, eds. and trans., A Translation of
 André-Michel Guerry's Essay on the Moral Statistics of France (1833): A Sociological Report
 to the French Academy of Science (Lewiston, 2002), x-xx, the fascinating introduction does
 tend to eulogize Guerry as a father-figure, relegating the highly original contributions of
 Süssmilch (and others) to a lower rung on the totemic hierarchy of modern sociology and
 criminology.
 12. Johann Peter Süssmilch, Die göttliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen
 Geschlechts aus der Geburt, dem Tode und der Fortpflanzung desselben (Berlin, 1741). Here,
 I have used the 1761/62 edition.
 13. Lars Behrisch, "Vermessen, Zählen, Berechnen des Raumes im 18. Jahrhundert," in
 Vermessen, Zählen, Berechnen. Die politische Ordnung des Raumes im 18. Jahrhundert, ed.
 Lars Behrisch (Frankfurt, 2006), 7-26.
 14- Frederick Stephen Crum, The Statisitical Work of Süssmilch (Boston, 1901), 6, 21.
 15. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, 1990), 21f.
 16. Ibid., 24; Mary Poovey, A History of the Modem Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the
 Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago, 1998), 308.
 17. Süssmilch (1761), vol. I, 181-86.
 18. Ibid., 57; see also Hacking, Taming of Chance, 20.
 19. Idem, 364-88. Graunt, an English Catholic, failed to make this connection.
 20. Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning
 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 74; Hacking, Taming of Chance, 21.
 21. Süssmilch (1762), vol. II, 28If.
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Moral Statistics, Modernity, Religion, and German Nationalism
 22. Ursula Baumann, Vom Recht auf den eigenen Tod. Die Geschichte des Suizids vom 18.
 bis 20. Jahrhundert (Weimar, 2001), 220.
 23. Gordon Marshall, "Moral Statistics," A Dictionary of Sociology (1998), Encyclopedia.
 com. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1088-moralstatistics.html (accessed May 4,
 2012).
 24- Baumann, Vom Recht auf den eigenen Tod. Die Geschichte des Suizids vom 18. bis 20.
 Jahrhundert, 220.
 25. Quoted from Whitt and Reinking, A Translation of André'Michel Guerry's Essay, 136.
 26. Ibid., 121.
 27. Hacking, Taming of Chance, 64: "I call the Anglo-French squabbling about suicide
 the beginning of numerical sociology because (a) there were numbers and (b) the
 numbers of suicide were seen as a moral indicator of the duality of life."
 28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid., 65ff.
 30. Ibid., 76. Here, Hacking argues that the reporting of suicide by the French ministry of
 justice originated as part of a professional turf-war with the medical profession over
 whether or not suicide was a disease (thereby subject to the medical authorities) or a
 crime.
 31. Stephen M. Stiegler, The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before
 1900 (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 161ff.
 32. Desrosières, Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning, 77ff. For a
 detailed explanation of the mathematical probabilities behind Quetelet's calculation of
 the "average man," see Stephen M. Stigler, Statistics on the Table: The History of Statistical
 Concepts and Methods, 169-74.
 33. On causation and Quetelet, see Stigler, Statistics on the Table: The History of Statistical
 Concepts and Methods, 51-65. On the religious overtones of the debate over free-will in
 nineteenth-century psychology/psychiatry, especially France before and after the 18th
 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, see Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French
 Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1987), 356-73.
 34. On other highly influential aspects of Wagner's political economics, from American
 fiscal policy to health care and the NHS, see Jürgen Backhaus, ed., Essays on Security and
 Taxation: Gustav Schmoller and Adolf Wagner reconsidered (Marburg, 1997).
 35. A good biography of Wagner, both in German and an English translation, can be
 found in Heinrich Rubner, Adolf Wagner. Briefe, Dokumente, Augenzeugenberichte (Berlin,
 1978), 428-38. Suicide hardly figures at all into Wagner's correspondence, where aca
 demic debates, political controversies and petty personal conflicts with colleagues consis
 tently loom largest.
 36. Considered autobiographically in Adolf Wagner, Mein Konfikt mit dem
 Grossindustriellen und Reichstagsabgeordneten Freiherm v. Stumm-Halberg: E. Streitschrift
 Z- Abwehr v. Angriffen, Beleidiggn u. Verdächtiggn; Aufsätze a. D. 'Zukunft' m. E. Nachw.,
 besonders z. Duellaffaire u. Üb. H. V. Stumm's Offiziersqualität (Berlin, 1895). Their quarrel
 was part of von Stumm-Halberg's attack on socialism. For Wagner, it indirectly contributed
 to his election to rector of the University of Berlin, while Wilhelm II subsequently dis
 tanced himself from his former friend. See Paul W. Massing, Rehearsal for Destruction: A
 Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany (New York, 1949), 127-35; the infor
 mation specifically relevant to Wagner is found on 243f, endnotes 8 & 9.
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Journal of Social History Spring 2013
 37. Ibid., 436. Years after his death, Wagner was transformed into an early hero of the
 Nazi movement; see Evalyn Clark, "Adolf Wagner: From National Economist to
 National Socialist," Political Science Quarterly 55 (1940): 378-411.
 38. Adolf Wagner, Die Gesetzmässigkeit in den scheinbar willkührlichen menschlichen
 Handlungen vom Standpunkte der Statistik (Hamburg, 1864).
 39. Ibid., 188.
 40. Stark and Bainbridge, Religion, Deviance and Social Control, 46ff.
 41. Wagner, Gesetzmässigkeit in den scheinbar willkührlichen menschlichen Handlungen vom
 Standpunkte der Statistik, 180.
 42. Ibid., 189.
 43. Zeitschrift fuer die gesammte Staatswissenschaft 36 (1880): 190-94- On Morselli, see
 Maria Teresa Brancaccio, "The Fatal Tendency of Civilized Society," Journal of Social
 History 46, no. 3 (2013): 700-15.
 44. Ibid.
 45. See Kenneth Barkin, "Adolf Wagner and German Industrial Development," The
 Journal of Modern History 41 (1969): 154f.
 46. Unpublished speech, "Warum muss sich der Geistliche um die Bodenreform kuemmem?"
 (1910). The speech, along with a large number of Wagner's personal papers are listed by
 the Berlin Staatsbibliothek as lost during the Second World War. Fortunately, however,
 a complete inventory of the library's holdings of his private papers was already catalogued
 in an article by Joachim Kirchner, "Adolf Wagners Nachlaß in der Preusischen
 Staatsbibliothek," Sonderabzug aus Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und
 Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche 192 (1927): 147-55.
 47. These comments appear in a later edition of Oettingen's Moralstatistik (Erlangen,
 1888), 24, as cited by Whitt and Reinking, A Translation of André-Michel Guerry's Essay,
 ix.
 48. Alexander von Oettingen, Uber die Akuten und Chronischen Selbstmord (Dorpat,
 1881).
 49. Alexander von Oettingen, Lutherische Dogmatik (Munich, 1897), 2 vols.
 50. Oettingen, Uber die Akuten und Chronischen Selbstmord, 4.
 51. Ibid., 28.
 52. Ibid., 31.
 53. Ernst Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt
 (Munich/Berlin, 1911)—published in the series Historische Bibliothek by the Historische
 Zeitschrift, flagship journal of the German National Historical Association.
 54. See Kirchner, Adolf Wagners Nachlaß; Ferdinand Tönnies, "Adolf Wagner," Deutsche
 Rundschau 174 (1918): 107ff.
 55. See Kirchner, Adolf Wagners Nachlaß.
 56. Ernst Troeltsch, Kritische Ausgabe: Band 2 Rezensionen und Kritiken ( 1894-1900)
 (Berlin, 2007), 501-7.
 57. See Dominick LaCapra, Emile Dürkheim (Ithaca, 1972), 156-71, for a useful explana
 tion of anomie as a sociological concept.
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Moral Statistics, Modernity, Religion, and German Nationalism
 58. On Charcot's struggle with anti-modernist Catholicism in France, see Goldstein,
 Console and Classify, op. cit. fn. 33.
 59. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of modernity (Cambridge, 1990), 7, describes
 Dürkheim as the proponent of the modernity thesis with the strongest faith in industrial
 progress and materialism.
 60. Henry Morselli, Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics (New York, 1888),
 36. On Morselli and his classic work, see also Brancaccio, "Fatal Tendency," of Civilized
 Society.
 61. Ibid., 81.
 62. Ibid., 372.
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:44:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
